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Abstract

This study examines the new German 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and
the Future of the Bundeswehr. Updated for the first time in over a decade, the document
reflects Germany’s reorientation of its security policy in order to become a global player.
This study analyzes the White Paper to determine its contextual meaning, domestic as
well as international support, and obstacles in the way of its implementation. Although
the German Government is concerned about waning US influence and increased Russian
activity, the German people are reluctant to let go of their nation’s foreign political
restraint in light of a lingering feeling of historical responsibility going back their Fascist
past and to WWII. The international and European reaction to the White Paper is largely
positive and hails Germany as a defender of Western Liberalism. Russia is less
enthusiastic and has embraced information warfare as a means of displaying its
displeasure. The study finds that resolving these issues will prove critical for the practical
success of failure in implanting the designs of the White Paper.

iv

Genealogy of the White Paper and Initial Reaction
The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the
Bundeswehr represents a reorientation of German Foreign Policy that calls for
remilitarization and increased German influence in the international community. This
Study will trace the history and background of the new German Strategic Framework
offered by the White Paper, analyze signals sent by the document to other countries,
determine domestic, then international reaction to the White Paper, and describe the three
biggest problems facing implementation of the White Paper while proposing ways to
address each.
The purpose of this thesis is not to debate particular policies included in the White
Paper, or to predict whether the White Paper is the correct path for Germany to take.
Since the White Paper has been published to wide support within the German political
elite, it seems likely that its proposed strategies will be pursued. This thesis will instead
focus on understanding the White Paper, analyzing reaction to it, and determining
challenges in its future.
In tracing the gestation of the White Paper, we first have to note that is an update
to a previous White Paper, the one from 2006. However, the 2016 White Paper is not
merely an update of language and tactics; rather it represents a transition to a new
German self-image. This change first became visible in the updated Defence Policy
Guidelines, released in May of 2011. Much stayed the same, like the emphasis on
“security and protection of German Citizens,” but for the first time it securitized
problems like failing states and climate change, turning them into issues of national

1

security. 1 These guidelines also called for reforms to the Bundeswehr, as the German
government looked toward the end of compulsorily military service slated to begin in
July of the same year. 2
Especially the need to transform the Bundeswehr into an attractive employer led
the Bundeswehr to publish The Reorientation of the German Army: Fight-Protect-HelpMediate in July of 2013. This document directly acknowledges the “political framework”
set forth by the 2011 guidelines, and establishes the Army’s focus as “Success on
Operations,” before moving into specific reforms of the army, such as recruiting reforms
and the restructuring of certain commands and specific units. 3
In the same year, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a German Institute
for International and Security Affairs, published “New Power, New Responsibility:
Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world.” 4 The report
heavily influenced the 2016 White Paper, which essentially quotes much of it. It called
on Germany to use its newfound power to re-enter international politics. New Power,
New responsibility contrasted sharply with the influential Economist article, Europe’s
Reluctant Hegemon which emphasized the German population’s reluctance to be seen as
leaders, in military endeavors and more broadly in European society. The Economist
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article citied Germany’s guilt over its past and fifty-year occupation by American and
Russian forces. 5 These two publications revealed the beginning of the split in outlook
between political elites and ordinary Germans, which chapters three and five will discuss.
The most significant development in 2014 was the publication of Review 2014—A
Fresh Look at Foreign Policy, a report on the yearlong effort to revamp Germany’s
Foreign Policy. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier ordered a comprehensive
evaluation of the ministry broken into three parts. The Review engaged with fifty foreign
policy experts around the world, its own employees, and held extensive talks with the
public at large to answer the question, “What, if anything, is wrong with German foreign
policy?” The Review ended with a summarized conclusion from the government. 6 The
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in “The ‘2014 Review’: Understanding the
Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the Expectations of the Rest of the World,”
summarized and analyzed the findings from a more critical perspective. The author
declared, “It is both inappropriate and unacceptable for policy to hide behind public
hearings, surveys or consultations with experts: policy must take a position and have the
courage to decide.” 7 Germany began acting on the Review by introducing the
Framework Nations Concept at the 2014 NATO summit.8 The Bundeswehr
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Beddoes, Zanny Minton. "Europe's Reluctant Hegemon." The Economist. June 15, 2013. Accessed
October 01, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-now-dominantcountry-europe-needs-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and.
6
Germany. Federal Foreign Office. Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy. Berlin: Bonifatius
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Major, Claudia, and Christian Moelling. "The Framework Nations Concept." Stiftung Wissenschaft Und
Politik, December 2014.
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simultaneously underwent the reform process in its attempts to entice attractive recruits
into its service. 9
Carnegie Europe published “The Right Kind of German Leadership for Europe,”
which claimed Germany lost sight of its vision for a unified Europe, lost its usual
propensity for compromise, and stopped cultivating relationships with its smaller
neighbors, all of which are critical to foreign policy success. 10 Carnegie also published
“Germany, still the Reluctant Hegemon,” which further discussed the divide between
Germany’s wish to align its de facto power and responsibility with the German
population’s “Culture of Restraint” since 1945. It further pointed out Germany’s lack of
hard power, emphasizing reports of maintenance problems with materiel, citing a finding
that only seven of forty-three naval helicopters were operational at that time. 11 Finally,
the Financial Times article, “Merkel Seeks to Navigate Germany’s Complex Relations
with Russia,” showed the growing German doubt that sanctions against Russia were not
succeeding. 12
In 2015, specific reforms began to take shape, and Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp,
Academic Director of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy, published an
Op-Ed listing five lessons the German government might learn from other countries who
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Smale, Alison. "A Dwindling Army Tempts New Recruits With a Charm Offensive." New York Times.
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Accessed October 01, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57046.
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pursued a “comprehensive” foreign policy initiative such as the White Paper proposes. 13
The SWP in “The White Paper on Defense Policy” emphasized that the last 20 years of
military history only offered two lessons, namely that the world, as it once was, was in
upheaval, and that the strategic environment and the effects of one’s actions were less
predictable than ever. The point being that the White Paper cannot and should not offer
specific policies, but rather outline a general mode of thinking and options for unknown
circumstances. 14 The military outlined its vision of “Leadership from the Middle”
meaning to lead by example, and from not just the geographic but political center of the
EU to ensure cooperation by its entirety. 15 Dr. Robin Niblett, director of Chatman House
and former COO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies delivered a speech
in Berlin on “International Expectations from Germany” where he called on Germany to
see itself not as a, “Mid-size power,” but as a, “mid-sized great power,” with significant
ability to affect its security environment. 16
Meanwhile in 2015, Russian-German relations continued to gain complexity.
Russia began its “War on Information” in earnest, by driving BBC and CNN off Russian
airwaves in favor of government-controlled outlets. 17 “Dominant Narratives in Russian
Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis” discussed common threads of
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5

Russian propaganda and noted Russia’s attempt to maintain relations with Europe while
still separating it from the US. 18 Pew Global found that 58% of Germans thought their
government should not use force if Russia invaded a neighboring country that is a NATO
ally. 19 This sentiment was much more prevalent in the former DDR, especially as
Germany attempted to maintain sanctions against Russia while leaving negotiations open
for a Russian-German Gas Pipeline. 20
German Foreign Policy in 2016 was naturally defined by the White Paper itself,
which was published in July by the German Government in both German and English. 21
Due to the short time it has been publically available, the White Paper has generated few
in depth reports thus far. Instead, current events and news articles have dominated
discussion on Germany’s Foreign Policy. Short pieces such as the article from War on the
Rocks “Germany Embraces Realpolitik Once More” summarize the White Paper more
than analyze it. 22 The Center for Strategic and International Studies not only applauded
the White Paper but also called for greater German Leadership within Europe. 23 In the
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Hutchings, Stephen, and Joanna Szostek. "Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse
during the Ukraine Crisis." E-International Relations. April 29, 2015. Accessed November 26, 2016.
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/28/dominant-narratives-in-russian-political-and-media-discourse-during-thecrisis/.
19
Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis,
but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. June 10,
2015. Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-forukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/.
20
Steinhauser, Gabriele. "Germany's Merkel Defends Russian Gas Pipeline Plan." WSJ. December 18,
2015. Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-merkel-defends-russian-gaspipeline-plan-1450447499.
21
Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper On German Security Policy and The Future Of The
Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016.
22
Deni, John R. "Germany Embraces Realpolitik Once More." War on the Rocks. September 18, 2016.
Accessed November 15, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/germany-embraces-realpolitik-oncemore/.
23
Rathke, Jeffrey. "Rising Ambitions and Growing Resources Mark New German Security Strategy."
Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 25, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/rising-ambitions-and-growing-resources-mark-new-german-security-strategy.
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same vein, Foreign Affairs announced, “Germany will be a responsible, restrained, and
reflective leader, guided in chief by its European instincts.” 24
Domestically, most of the political elite supported the White Paper, although the
right wing party, Alternative für Deutschland claims, “[the] White Paper leads the
military in the wrong direction.” 25
Another great theme of 2016 on the global stage has been the American election.
Of particular note was the near universal complaint by all presidential candidates that
NATO was not pulling its own weight. 26 After the election of Donald Trump, just a few
days ago as of the date of this writing, Angela Merkel announced her candidacy for her
fourth term as Chancellor, leading many to call her, “The Liberal West’s Last
Defender.” 27
Russia reacted poorly to the White Paper. Thus the Russian Today article “From
Partner to Rival: Germany to Designate Russia ‘a Security Challenge.’” 28 Russia is
continuing its information war on Germany, producing heavily biased newspaper articles,
prompting Deutsche Welle to report “Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German

24
Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. "Germany's New Global Role." Foreign Affairs. August 15, 2016. Accessed
October 01, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13/germany-s-new-global-role.
25
Pazderski, Georg. "Das Weissbuch Fuhrt Die Bundeswehr in Die Falsche Richtung." Alternative Fuer
Deutschland. July 14, 2016. Accessed November 26, 2016. https://www.alternativefuer.de/pazderski-dasweissbuch-fuehrt-die-bundeswehr-in-die-falsche-richtung/.
26
Kessler, Glenn. "Trump’s Claim That the U.S. Pays the ‘lion’s Share’ for NATO." Washington Post.
March 30, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2016/03/30/trumps-claim-that-the-u-s-pays-the-lions-share-for-nato/.
27
Smale, Alison, and Steven Erlanger. "Donald Trump’s Election Leaves Angela Merkel as the Liberal
West’s Last Defender." The New York Times. November 12, 2016. Accessed November 27, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/europe/germany-merkel-trump-election.html?_r=0.
28
"From Partner to Rival: Germany to Designate Russia 'a Security Challenge' – Report." RT International.
June 5. 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/345466-germany-securitychallenges-russia/.
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Elections.” 29 However, German support for Russia did not appear to wane as claimed in
“Frayed Partnership: German Public Opinion on Russia.” 30
The EU has begun to seriously consider the idea of a European Army, and
Votewatch, in a piece titled “What Chances for a Real European Common Security and
Defense Policy?” analyzed the EU’s reactions to those proposals. 31 Carnegie Europe
detailed problems for a successful integration of a European Army in “Policy or Project?
France, Germany, and EU Defense.” 32 However, after the election of Donald Trump to
the American presidency, a frantic meeting was called where broad support for increased
European security was found. 33
Finally, the German Government has begun to move towards its next foreign
policy publication, soliciting public opinion through the Peacelab 2016 format. 34
Overall, it needs to be pointed out that the build-up and subsequent reaction to the
2016 White Paper did not happen quite in the linear fashion as sketched here, as foreign

29
"Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German Elections." DW.COM. November 8, 2016.
Accessed November 26, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-warns-of-russian-cyber-attacks-in-germanelections/a-36314197.
30
Scholer, Gabriele, and Agnieska Lada. "Frayed Partnership: German Public Opinion on
Russia." Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, Institute of Public Affairs, April 2016. Accessed November 11,
2016. https://www.bertelsmannstiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Frayed_Partnership_2016_ENG.pdf.
31
Chitul, Eva, and Doru Frantescu. "What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense
Policy?" VoteWatch What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense Policy Comments.
September 29, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/what-chances-for-areal-european-common-security-and-defense-policy/.
32
KEOHANE, DANIEL. "Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense." Carnegie Europe.
August 2, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64222.
33
Mailonline, Dave Burke For. "EU Chief Mounts Fresh Call for European Army, Claiming 'Americans
Won't Protect Us Forever'" Mail Online. November 10, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3923068/EU-chief-mounts-fresh-call-European-army-claimingAmericans-won-t-protect-forever.html.
34
"PeaceLab2016: A Fresh Look at Crisis Prevention." PeaceLab2016. August 14, 2016. Accessed
November 02, 2016.
http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/friedensfoerderung/article/peacelab2016-a-fresh-lookat-crisis-prevention/.
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policy initiatives are influenced by constantly changing risks, interests, and opinions of
the domestic and international community. The next chapter, therefore, will break down
the White Paper and analyze its meaning as reflected in the reactions of other nations and
institutions, while subsequent chapters will consider the domestic and then international
reactions to the document. The conclusion will offer advice for overcoming the three
biggest obstacles to a successful implementation of the White Paper: an uncooperative
yet influential Russia, a perceived lack of domestic support, and the need for quick action
within the EU.

9

Main Political Thrusts of the White Paper
The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the
Bundeswehr is not the first written by the German Government. In fact, Germany
published a White Paper yearly from 1969 to 1976, and thereafter in 1979, 1983, 1985,
1994, and 2006. The time between the 2006 White Paper and the 2016 is the second
largest gap in the history of German White Paper publication. The first chapter discussed
the lineage of the new White Paper, but this chapter will focus on the question of why a
new White Paper needed to be written.
Chancellor Merkel’s answer in the forward is that due to the, “changed security
situation, the task of the Federal Government is to redefine our country’s security policy
interests, priorities and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly.” 1 The second
purpose is, “to generate a debate in society on how Germany shapes its security policy in
the future.” Her letter defines what the Security Paper is and why a strategy is needed, but
other than the same vague claim that, “our security environment has changed
considerably since [2006],” 2 it does not answer, “why 2016?”
The simplest answer is that it takes a long time for a bureaucracy the size a
government to gather, analyze, and synthesize data into a comprehensive document. It
took 2 years after Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier began “Review 2014—A
Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” to create the White Paper. The Foreign Minister reached
out to fifty experts abroad, employees in the Federal Foreign Office, and the German

1

Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper On German Security Policy and The Future Of The
Bundeswher. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, 6.
2
Ibid., 15.
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public to ask, “What, if anything, is wrong with German Foreign Policy? What needs to
be changed?” 3 The responses fit overwhelming into two categories and drove the
creation of the White Paper.
The first answer was that, “To the majority of those surveyed, what is wrong with
German policy is not so much specific actions or omissions, but rather a perceived lack of
predictability.” 4 Experts living across the globe wrote statements like, “Germany’s Africa
policy is ambivalent,” “Gulf States don’t see a clear German foreign policy strategy,” and
“Germany: An Unsure Power in Conflicts,” in South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and
Afghanistan respectively. 5 This indicated a collective failure by the German government
to articulate its goals, policies, and methods coherently.
The second issue was the, “growing gulf between the expectation of Germany’s
allies and partners that it take on a larger role in international politics, and Germany’s
self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which the German public largely favors.” 6
Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is said to have long neglected to
sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable to dependable foreign
policy.” 7 The lack of a clear mandate by the German people is a barrier to German
projection of power, and is addressed at length in the third chapter.
While written as a response to a, “changed security situation,” the security
environment is always changing and chronically unknowable. This cannot be the sole
reason for writing a new White Paper. Instead, it is a signaling device to other countries.

3

Germany. Federal Foreign Office. Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy. Berlin, 2014.
Ibid., 20.
5
Ibid., 23.
6
Ibid., 21.
7
Ibid., 20.
4

11

It is not the changed security environment but the need to update German relations with
other countries that convinced Germany to also update its White Paper.
Germany’s updated foreign policy means different things to different actors, and
the differences are worth examining. The White Paper is comprehensive, yet broad. Just
as in the White Paper, this chapter examines selected countries or alliances alone while
making general assumptions about other groups of countries, and will start with the
European Union.
The preamble of the German Basic Law states Germany’s, “determination to
promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe [emphasis added]. 8
Germany doubles down on this commitment with the new White Paper. It acknowledges
that, “what is important for the common security space of our continent is thus not the
development of a new security architecture…but adherence to existing and proven
common rules and principles.” 9 Germany benefits immensely from interconnected
Europe; unfortunately, it also foresees an erosion of the EU. Written before the Brexit,
the White Paper addresses the fact that the European Project is, “under pressure.” 10
Whereas the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines stated German security interest as,
“strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership,” 11 the White Paper
describes its security interest as, “deepening European integration.” 12 This subtle change
of words disguises large meaning for Germany’s future in Europe. There is a fundamental

8

German Basic Law, 13.
White Paper, 32.
10
Ibid., 33.
11
German Minister of Defense. "Defence Policy Guidelines." German Ministry of Defence. May 27, 2011.
Accessed October 20, 2016. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157024/Germany%20engl.pdf. 4.
12
White Paper, 25.
9
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difference between partnership and integration. Partnership can be as small as a single
unilateral agreement such as an economic, security, or political policy. Integration is the
merging and pooling of resources. For example, France wants a security partnership with
Germany but to retain the autonomy to intervene unilaterally, whereas Germany seeks to
integrate all European hard-power into a “European Army.” 13
The apocryphal quote of Henry Kissinger that Germany is, “too big for Europe,
too small for the world,” is taken to heart by the White Paper. The paper acknowledges
that, “The economies of emerging powers in Asia and Latin America will likely overtake
the German—although not the European—gross domestic product in the coming
years.” 14 Germany is signaling to its neighbors that the best way to stay relevant and
carry influence in the 21st century is by sticking together in all respects—although this
study focuses on EU security initiatives.
Germany believes in “Fuehrung aus der Mitte,” or, “leading from the center.” In
essence, this means setting the example and being the change Germany wants to see in
the world. At the 51st Munich security conference, Defense Minister Ursula von der
Leyen described leading from the center as, “being the best at providing resources and
professional expertise among our allies and partners.” 15 Since World War II, Germany
has been averse to leading from the front, and leads more comfortably by example and
consensus. Fuehrung aus der Mitte is a way to balance Germany’s interest in maintaining
the European Union with Germany’s reluctance to actually direct fellow member-states.

13

KEOHANE, DANIEL. "Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense." Carnegie Europe.
August 2, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64222.
14
White Paper, 22.
15
Marberg, Jan. "Fuehrung Aus Der Mitte." Bundeswehr Aktuell, February 9, 2015. 1.
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As mentioned, the ultimate goal of European security integration for Germany is
to create a European army. The White Paper seeks to achieve this through the Framework
Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC is essentially an updated version of the “Pooling and
Sharing” program proposed by Germany in 2013, with the idea that Germany, France,
Great Britain, and possibly Italy and Turkey will take leadership as a “cluster.” Smaller
states than integrate their armies under the leadership of a cluster. In this case, the big
states provide the breadth of military operations while the smaller nations inside the
cluster provide the depth with personnel, equipment, and funding. 16 The German thinktank SWP rightfully recognizes that once these clusters have been created, it will take
significant political capital to withdraw troops from one. German politicians have a,
“common understanding that integrated European Forces can only be achieved in a stepby-step approach,” and the FNC is the beginning of such a concept . 17 So far 16 countries
have joined the FNC. There has not been an official British withdrawal from the FNC
following the Brexit, and the Polish Defense Minister claims, “Britain’s military
involvement will not only be upheld, but also increased.” 18 The fourth chapter addresses
the success of the FNC and the future of an integrated European Army.
By re-committing themselves to the FNC, however, Germany is highlighting its
commitment to financial and operational relevance. As with all German policies enacted

16
Major, Claudia, and Christian Moelling. "The Framework Nations Concept." Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, December 2014. 2
17
Allers, Robin. "The Framework Nation: Can Germany Lead on Security?" International Affairs 92, no. 5
(2016): 1167-187. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12702.
18
Szary, Wiktor. "Poland Looks to Stronger UK NATO Role after Brexit." Reuters. July 05, 2016.
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with a “Leading from the Middle” approach, explicitly stating its commitment and
progress with the FNC goads Germany’s neighbors into action as well.
Germany continues to establish bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, with the
end goal of building trust and cohesion. These agreements provide a common ground to
leverage those countries into the FNC. Germany is thus a part of the French-German
Brigade, the German-Netherlands Corps, the German-Polish-Danish Multinational Corps,
the Multinational Joint Headquarters in Ulm, and rotational leadership of the Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force; it actively participates within the European Corps and
regularly contributes troops to standing NATO operations such as the Airborne Warning
and Control System. Germany also has a permanent mutual exchange of troops with both
the Netherlands and Poland, and in July 2016, Germany stationed a battalion in Lithuania
to serve as a deterrent to perceived Russian aggression. 19
Germany also plans a European Army in a simpler way, by opening up the
Bundeswehr to any citizens of the EU for military service, similar to the French Foreign
Legion. The White Paper claims, “Opening up the Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU
would not only offer potential wide-ranging integration and regeneration and thus
strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it would also send out a strong signal
for a European approach.” 20 Although international response was negative, the
consideration of such a proposal shows its interest in a European army.
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Germany is sending a clear signal to the UN about its foreign policy goals as well.
The White Paper details Germany’s goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council:
Germany will continue to help the UN adapt to increasingly complex tasks, in
particular by… making steady progress towards the long-term goal of reforming
the Security Council… Germany remains willing to assume greater responsibility
as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council. 21
Germany has been seeking a permanent seat with veto power for over a decade. Germany
believes its newfound status comes with a responsibility to change the international
community. If they assume this responsibility, they expect to receive the legitimate power
consummate with their financial and political efforts. After celebrating 25 years of
reunification, a seat on the Security Council would be proof to the world and to Germans
themselves of their international influence. The White Paper is the latest push for such a
seat since 2011, when Chancellor Merkel reportedly traveled throughout Africa in an
attempt to garner support for a German UN bid. 22
Germany’s relationship with NATO is more complex. One reason why Germany
is so interested in the creation of a European army is fiscal considerations. The US has
stated that in the coming years it will only provide 50% to each of NATO’s capabilities
[via funding] in the future. 23 As the US currently provides over 72% of total NATO
spending, this leaves a large spending gap. President-elect Trump has openly called upon
NATO to contribute more and even questioned US involvement with NATO in the first
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place. The White Paper firmly and repeatedly commits itself to spending at least 2% of
Germany’s GDP on Defense per year, which would nearly double its defense spending to
74 billion dollars. 24
Also present is a German feeling that the US will continue to limit its influence in
world security. The White Paper treats the subject lightly, but without the usual
identifying of the US as a hegemon (benign or otherwise), the White Paper notes,
“[p]olitically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a
multipolar order.” 25 More bluntly, the paper continues, “In this multipolar world, the
United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy.
In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in
Europe, to take on more responsibility.” 26 Traditional rhetoric around the US since the
end of the Cold War has corroborated its place as the world hegemon. The fact that any
doubt exists as to the absolute hegemony of the US represents a dramatic change in the
nature of the international relations. In a time where Germany believes US influence is
waning, Germany wants to grow and fill in the gap.
Although the White Paper states repeatedly that the solidification, growth, and
perpetuation of NATO is its goal, the White Paper troublingly encourages ad-hoc, bi and
multi-lateral alliances, and other new formats of international cooperation. The paper
claims, “new formats…do not affect the importance of established organizations. The

24
White Paper 67, 69; Kottasova, Ivana. "Which NATO Members Are Falling Short on Military
Spending?"
CNNMoney. April 15, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/15/news/nato
spending-countries.
25
White Paper, 30.
26
Ibid.

17

UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE will continue to provide the primary framework for
our actions.” 27 However, there is a duality in calling for the strengthening of international
institutions like the UN, NATO, and the EU while at the same time explicitly opening
Germany to informal formats such as the G7 and G20.
For example, the G7 is a format for the seven richest countries in the world to
dialogue, problem solve, and reach agreements. However, these seven countries represent
over 64% of the net global wealth. 28 While far from perfect, the UN has checks and
balances built into its charter to protect citizens of the world regardless of wealth or
country. Even if the G7 has not acted in an exploitive manner, the informal format itself
takes away influence from the rules-based UN. Although an initiative may be easier to
achieve in an informal format, the appearance to smaller countries is that, “might makes
right”; leaders must balance the time and effort cost of making decisions inside of the UN
with the political cost of doing it through informal formats.
Although perhaps not realpolitik—that is, making decisions on practical rather
than ideological considerations—the White Paper does not appreciate the severity of
normalizing these formats, stating, “in cases where it can protect its interests in this way,
[Germany] will participate in ad hoc cooperation and initiate it with its partners.” 29 It
may be impossible and impractical to ignore them, but official commitment to informal
formats weakens the formal institutions maintaining the same, “rules-based international
order on the basis of international law,” which Germany names as a security interest. 30
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The White Paper focuses on the short term at the expense of solid, long-term stability.
The paper regrets erosion of international institutions while at the same time contributing
to their decline. The SWP warned in 2014 that:
The states of the West have contributed to weakening the existing architecture of
global norms and institutions, whether by acting inconsistently or using double
standards, by employing trade discrimination, or even by not sufficiently
legitimizing the use of military force, by resorting to informal “coalitions of the
willing” and ad-hoc formats such as the G-20, or simply by their failure to
appropriately adapt the international order to the new challenges until now. 31
Germany appears to be hoping for the best, but planning for the worst. The White Paper
reveals a fundamental belief that existing international institutions will become less
significant in the future. However, the belief itself contributes to breakdown of the
international institutions that brought relative peace to the last 70 years. If one believes
these institutions are responsible for that peace, and Germany believes their influence to
be in decline, the White Paper’s signals to potential rivals take on a new seriousness.
Although obfuscated behind political terminology, the message is clear: “stay out
of our way.” Germany, “too small for the world,” from a realist perspective is
strengthening European ties to gain power. It is true that the EU has problems that will
need solving with German leadership and resources. However, as mentioned before when
comparing German vs European GDP to other regions of the world, maintaining their
current level of influence will only be possible in the future with Europe’s backing. 32
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Germany is enhancing its alliance with the West to win power and influence in an
anarchic world. However, Germany believes that if it takes too much of the spotlight, the
plan will backfire as Europeans and Germans themselves will rebel and balance against
too strong a Germany. Thus the policy of, “Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” The White Paper
claims that, “[i]t is not might but right that creates lasting peace and stability,” 33 and
excepting its new commitment to informal formats, Germany has spent the last 25 years
working within the rules-based international order to earn that right. Germany is now
warning its challengers that any break from the status quo will not be acceptable.
Germany is beyond just worrying about Russian expansionism. With the
increased use of Hybrid Warfare in Crimea and the Ukraine, “Russia is creating
uncertainty about the nature of its intentions.” 34 If viewed again from a realist paradigm,
in the absence of absolute US hegemony, Germany sees Russian as a competitor for the
power given up by the US.
Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its
willingness to use force to advance its own interest and to unilaterally redraw
borders…Russia is rejecting a close partnership with the West and placing
emphasis on strategic rivalry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an
independent power center with global ambitions. 35

The White Paper displays some extent of German exceptionalism, as while they
write about Russian global ambition with disdain, just pages earlier they claim,
“Germany has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order.” 36 What
is different is that Germany is attempting to assert itself globally through transparent,
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rules based accepted forums like the EU, NATO, and the UN. Even the informal formats
it participates in like the G20 are somewhat normalized in the international community.
The message to Moscow is clear. Waning US power is leaving a global power vacuum
that Germany intends to fill.
Germany continues to give Russia the, “speak softly and carry a big stick,”
treatment, by accusing Russia of creating a, “strategic rivalry.” Germany does not accept
the rivalry, and instead insists it is a Russian construction. Germany thus does not commit
itself to being Russia’s enemy, but is still flexing its muscles, arguing for, “the right
balance between collective defence…on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative
security and sectoral cooperation on the other.” 37
On first approach, German concerns about China seem to be purely based on
economic might. The White Paper only explicitly mentions China twice in the White
Paper, once in a list of the current UN Security Council. The second is because China,
“could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will
account for approximately one sixth.” 38 However, more analysis reveals that Germany is
less concerned about the rising Chinese economy, and instead about its military
ambitions.
Even if one analyzes the global economy as if it were a zero-sum game, Germany
will continue to find itself in a strong economic position. Dr. Niblett, a British
international relations expert said in a conference about the White Paper, “Germany is the
world’s fourth largest economy…more important, it is structurally strong. In a country
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like China, the number two in the world economy, I would not want to be sitting in
Beijing trying to work out how to get China through its middle income trap. Will it face a
great depression?” 39 More important than arguing about the long-term stability of the
Chinese market, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is the concrete structural
strength of the German economy. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers points
to unique strengths of the German manufacturing industry. Unlike other manufacturing
countries with a small number of large companies—where the loss of one enterprise due
to outsourcing is an incredible blow to the economy, Germany’s manufacturing base is
mostly made of small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s), which dominate niche
markets. 40 More than 1,130 SME’s are either number one or two in the world market for
their products, where, “superior quality and performance enables them to command
premium prices.” 41
Although not explicitly, Germany’s White Paper reveals concern with Chinese
naval presence in the South China Sea. The paper mentions the importance of free and
unimpeded trade routes for German economic success ten times in its one hundred and
thirty-nine-pages, an average of once every fourteen pages. 42 When listing the 7 missions
of the Bundeswehr, the picture chosen for emphasis is that of three German naval ships
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with the caption, “responsibility in matters of foreign and security policy – the security of
our maritime routes is of great importance.” 43
The US is engaged in, “Freedom of Navigation Operations,” 44 in the South China
Sea in order to prioritize free-trade routes. Germany supports these as Germany wants,
“to make clear that Beijing must uphold international law as it seeks a bigger global
role.” 45 By looking at Sino-German economic relations, it is easy to see why Germany
avoids directly addressing these concerns in the White Paper. Approximately 20% of
Chinese trade is with the EU, and, “Germany remains China’s principal trading partner in
the European Union.” 46 This bi-lateral partnership expands even beyond the economic, as
in 2014, “[Sino-German] relations were upgraded to a ‘comprehensive strategic
partnership.” 47 Germany clearly feels uncomfortable berating a close partner in a
comprehensive strategic document like the White Paper. Russia’s treatment has been
harsher because Russia has officially claimed territory, whereas China has not yet
attempted to exercise its “sovereignty” in the South China Sea with violence.
Although Germany’s official acceptance of informal formats, commitment to
funding NATO, and stern strategic rhetoric on Russia are new, the most surprising and
radical changes of German foreign policy concern “spoiler” states. Spoiler states are
states that proliferate weapons of mass destruction, support or harbor terrorists, or are
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fragile states in a strategic location, because, “in today’s globalized world, a local
problem can quickly develop into a regional or international problem.” 48
Previous White Papers cursorily mentioned intervention, stating that the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s, “abilities include the entire
spectrum…including conflict prevention and conflict intervention,” 49 and that regional
conflicts could hurt Germany, such as the collapse of Yugoslavia, which, “could only be
resolved through determined and unified intervention from the international
community.” 50 The new White Paper, however, specifies the need for future intervention.
It bluntly states, “Germany must participate in the prevention and stabilization of crises
and conflicts as well as in post-crisis and post-conflict management.” 51
As to how it will do so, the White Paper hedges its bets. It recommends, “robust
military intervention,” and the maintenance of military means across, “all levels of
intensity, from…humanitarian operations to robust peace enforcement [emphasis
added].” 52 The UN principles of peacekeeping operations define peace enforcement as
interventions not requiring the consent of the main parties, but which may involve the use
of military force at the strategic or international level. 53 The difference between the two is
both that of consent and that of extremes. This is a signal that for the first time in its
history, Germany may be willing to do more than training police forces and actively
deploy troops into failing states.
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Further supporting this claim is the earmarking of funds for the Enhance and
Enable Initiative (E2I) for the first time in 2016. 54 E2I is primarily a way to, “export
security beyond the external borders of the European Union,” in the context of training,
education, and the provision of equipment. 55 Chapter 3 considers E2I in depth, but its
creation is a signal to fragile states that they can expect assistance, including arms
exports, from Germany, even if the EU or other organizations deny them that assistance.
The White Paper repeatedly reiterates that an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure, noting the high costs of foreign unemployment of young males, and
stating, “[O]ur comprehensive approach will therefore place an even stronger focus on
the labor market.” 56 The White Paper also securitizes pandemics, taking them out of the
medical realm and into the room of national security. Outbreaks in even small states have
a possibility of growing into an pandemic which can affect the German population. The
White Paper promises Germany’s commitment to organizations like the European
Medical Corps and the World Health Organization. 57
The language of the White Paper is often left purposely obscure, for reasons that
will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Other parts, however, are addressed bluntly
and directly, and almost any nation, regardless of how it categorizes its relationship with
Germany—friend and ally, rising power, or weak state—has information to glean from
the 2016 White Paper. Of course, signals are only as powerful as other state’s belief in
them. Without legitimacy from Germany in the shape of concrete policy, money, and
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domestic support, other countries cannot believe and act on the information Germany is
sending.
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Ambivalence of Domestic Support
The Results of the Foreign Policy Review 2014 revealed the, “growing gulf
between the expectation of Germany’s allies and partners that it take on a larger role in
international politics and Germany’s self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which
the German public largely favors.” 1 Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is
said to have long neglected to sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable
to dependable foreign policy.” 2 Just as the 2016 White Paper is a signal to foreign
governments, it is a signal to the people of Germany. Explicitly stated:
The 2016 White Paper is the first of its kind to be based on an inclusive
participation phase. National and international experts as well as interested citizens were
given various opportunities to participate in the discussion about the future of German
Security Policy...The White Paper is also an invitation and a request to actively continue
the security policy debate following its publication, as security policy is a permanent
endeavor for society as a whole in an open and healthy democracy. 3

In this sense, however, the White Paper is at odds with itself. The German
Government produced an animation titled Explained through video: The 2016 White
Paper. 4 At four minutes, the animation is just long enough to become condescending
with its non-stop cartoon sound effects, while short enough to appear simplistic. This
video distills meaning to the lowest common denominator, while the White Paper is
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actually often written in legal language with highly specific meaning behind it. Citing and
conflating three different constitutional articles, one section of the White Paper explains
constitutional authority in deploying the Bundeswehr inside Germany. 5 Chapter Two of
this study explained the significance of “robust peace enforcement” which is a benign
term with huge implications.
There is no perfect balance between the two. Public outreach will always either be
too complicated as to be accessible, or too simplified to be meaningful. What is important
to recognize, however, is that the time for public input on the White Paper is closed. The
Government is no longer inviting debate on the topic but attempting to drive political
opinion to support the White Paper’s policies.
The German Government has had moderate success in changing public opinion to
support its foreign policy initiatives, but when it comes time to follow through on hard
choices, public support dwindles. This is evident in the recruitment crisis facing the
Bundeswehr and in public opinion on Russia and the Ukraine crisis. However, because
the public was heavily involved in the creation of the White Paper and polls reflect their
consent for the broad objectives, it is now the responsibility of the German Government
to execute its strategy even if the public does not agree on all specific issues.
Public Opinion about increasing German influence was initially low. During
Frank Steimer’s “Review 2014—A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” a poll from the
Koerber Foundation found that 60% of Germans believed, “Germany should continue to
exercise [international] restraint.” 6 The review broke down foreign involvement into
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categories and attempted to argue that Germans only disagreed with military
involvement. This was partially true, but only a minority of Germans supported taking in
refugees or supporting other countries’ military interventions (even without direct
military participation). 82% wanted decreased engagement in military operations, the
same number who wanted to decrease the amount of arms supplied to allied countries. 7
Much can change in two years. An updated 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center
found that today 53% of Germans believe their country should help other countries deal
with their problems. 8 While the exact same question was not asked, in the 2014 Koerber
Foundation Polls only 37% of Germans thought Germany should be more engaged. 74%
believe that the EU should play a more active role in world affairs than it does today and
62% think human rights should be one of Germany’s most important foreign policy
goals. Another large success has been Germany’s approach to leadership, as 67% of
Germans think that, “in foreign policy, our country should take allies’ interests into
account even if it means compromising.” 9 The German people strongly support
“Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” In these terms, the White Paper seems to fit with popular
opinion.
The German government drove this radical two-year change in German
perspective. The outreach began concurrently with the Koerber polls as part of the same
2014 review. One third of the entire project focused on engaging debate with domestic
Germany. Beginning in July of 2014, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) held over 60
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forums, panel debates, conferences, and simulation workshops. 10 The FFO claims to have
succeeded in institutionally learning not, “[to] simply make difficult decisions in cabinet
meetings and then announce them on the news: Instead, we need to campaign for our
convictions and share the content of our decision at many events.” 11
Even though the 2014 Review is over, the webpage has been specifically archived
so that its lessons will not be forgotten. 12 Another lesson learned was the importance of
online engagement, which has led to a continuation of clear, user-friendly websites for all
major German Foreign Policy Initiatives. 13
The 2016 White Paper website is detailed and clearly organized into 11 sections;
these include a “dialogue” page with reactions from 53 everyday citizens, experts in
videos breaking down “questions about the White Paper”, and a download page with
links to various literature surrounding German Foreign Policy.
The conversation about the White Paper has finished, and the updated public
foreign policy debate currently revolves around “Peace Lab 2016.” Peace Lab 2016 is a
format that began on the 5th of July (just days after the release of the White Paper)
seeking public opinion on the government’s attempt, “[to] establish new guidelines for
managing crises and conflicts by the spring of 2017.” 14 In the same fashion as the 2014
Review and the 2016 White Paper, Peace Lab 2016 summarizes debates and forums on
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various topics surrounding crisis management, with a twitter account used to announce
upcoming events.
In contrast to earlier attempts, however, there is not a dedicated forum for Internet
discussion. Instead, Peace Lab 2016, “heartily invites you to take part in this discussion:
share or comment on this discussion on Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter! If you have your
own idea for a discussion, please tell us via our email!” 15 This is an attempt to reach a
wider, broader, and younger audience than in previous endeavors. Without a dedicated
space in which only the political engaged will talk, it must be shared on social media, and
should theoretically be read and discussed by a much larger number of people. It is not
possible to divine causation from correlation, and increased German support for
international engagement may have come from any number of sources. However, the
public outreach performed by the German Government appears to have been at least
moderately successful, and was certainly not a failure.
The German Government, however, was less successful in turning broad support
for its strategy into support for concrete action. The largest disconnects in which the
public disagrees with the White Paper strategy relate to the Bundeswehr and the
Ukrainian Crisis. Despite the White Paper’s promise to raise military funding from 1.2%
to 2% of Germany’s GDP, only 34% of Germans support increasing defense spending,
whereas 64% support keeping it the same or even reducing it. The German Government
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is listening, as the planned defense budget for 2020 remains the same as its 2016 levels. 16
85% of Germans believe ISIS is a “major threat” to Germany, but only 29% believe using
military force is the best way to defeat terrorism.
More important than polling numbers about Germany’s political will to fight or
properly fund its military is its ability to field soldiers. Regardless of public opinion on
foreign policy, unless Germany has the personnel to effect change in its environment,
none of its opinions matter. After the end of mandatory military service five years ago,
Germany is still struggling to recruit members. Attempts by the German Government to
increase recruiting have failed, mostly because of bad public perception of the
Bundeswehr. The White Paper tells us that:
The people in this country recognize the importance of our citizens in
uniform. They rely on them, they are grateful, and they feel connected to
them. Their interest in them is sincere. This is expressed in a multitude of
respectful gestures and words. Surveys have shown that a growing
majority of Germans highly regard and trust the Bundeswehr. Not least of
all the positive response at public events such as the Bundeswehr Day has
shown that the Bundeswehr is firmly embedded in society. 17

Interestingly, on the same page of the White Paper, there is a photo of a worker
scraping paint off the entrance to the Bundeswehr recruiting station in Berlin. The front
entrance was paint bombed in blue and red as an act of vandalism and protest in
November of 2015. 18 The juxtaposition of a paragraph explaining the public support of
the Bundeswehr with a picture of a vandalized recruiting center does not seem to fit.
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Alison Smale of the New York Times determined that in 2024, 17% of male
Germans born in 2006 will need to volunteer to serve in the Bundeswehr. 19 Less than
700,000 children will come of age in 2024, and half are girls, seven times less likely to
serve than their male peers. The Defence Minister’s annual goal is 60,000 applicants. In
2012, one year after conscription ended, the Bundeswehr already missed its target of
volunteers by 37.7%. 20
The White Paper acknowledges this problem and will attempt to make the
military more attractive by creating modern accommodations, flexible working
conditions, childcare arrangements, state of the art IT equipment, and improved pay and
social security for service members. 21 A second idea proposed by the German
government was the creation of “Bundeswehr Day” (Tag der Bundeswehr). As the
aviation website Checksix noted during their coverage of the Luftwaffe’s demonstration
during Bundeswehr Day, “In the past, the primary concern of the Bundeswehr was
demonstrating its equipment and capabilities, nowadays however, its main concern is
attracting new recruits voluntarily into its ranks.” 22 Ironically, however, Robert Kysela
notes in his review of the airshow that although the day was a, “great success!”,
unfortunately, “this event was definitely no airshow as the Bundeswehr generally do not
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like to attract a lot of attention and as such the demonstrations were generally quite
restrained.” 23
Even in the midst of a recruitment crisis, on a day meant to make the military
cool, the Bundeswehr did not feel comfortable showing off. In the view of the current
public, the Bundeswehr should be seen and not heard, and is not seen as a desirable place
to work.
The 2016 White Paper mentions one last strategy to increase recruitment of the
Bundeswehr, this time without the need to increase public opinion. A Bundeswehr open
to all citizens of the EU. This idea is mentioned only once throughout the whitepaper, and
hidden inside of a paragraph, rather than highlighted as a bullet point. At the bottom of
the seven-sentence paragraph, the White Paper states, “Last but not least, opening up the
Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU would not only offer potential for wide-ranging
integration and regeneration and thus strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it
would also send out a strong signal for a European approach.” 24
Limited public response to this idea has been decidedly negative. The German
Newspaper Deutsche Welle reported on the proposal and notes that the Bundestag would
have to change the German Military Act. Political opposition to this is already mounting,
such as from MP Alexander Neu who complained that most recruits will come from
economically weak countries, a population he does not want to give access to Germany. 25
Secondly, European Partners need to be consulted and in many cases special agreements

23

Ibid.
White Paper, 120.
25
"Controversial Move: Bundeswehr Wants to Recruit EU Citizens." Deutsche Welle. August 12, 2016.
Accessed October 24, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/controversial-move-bundeswehr-wants-to-recruit-eucitizens/a-19469214.
24

34

made. Finally, the German Armed Forces Association, which represents the interest of
over 200,000 current and former soldiers made it clear that they would not be quick to
give their approval, as questions like loyalty to Germany first need consideration. 26 There
has been no policy initiative aimed at realizing this idea. It appears that at least for now,
the idea is tabled as it was received with a soft but firm “no” from the public.
The German Public slowly accepted Germany’s increased role on the
international playing field, but has not been as receptive in actually supporting the
Bundeswehr. Another area of foreign policy citizens resist is the White Paper’s take on
Russia. Although 62% of Germans think human rights should supersede other foreign
policy goals, according the Human Rights Watch, “Russian authorities have created a
pervasive climate of fear and repression in Crimea in the two years since it has occupied
the peninsula,” yet Germans still do not support their government’s sanctioning of Russia
in reaction to the Ukrainian crisis. 27
Only 31% of Germans see Russia as a threat to their country, and 58% of
Germans think, “having a strong economic relationship with Russia is more important
than being tough on Russia with foreign policy disputes.” In a 2015 poll, 77% of
Germans opposed sending arms to Ukraine. 28 While this may seem surprising to the
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uninitiated, it makes sense when one considers the political, cultural, and economic ties
Germany has with Russia.
Many officials “spent decades” working with Moscow during German
reunification, and business leaders have much to gain and lose in gas supplies and export
markets. 29 The Pew Research Center supports these findings, as only 26% of those living
in West Germany support decreasing the economic sanctions on Russia, while 42% of
East Germans support decreasing the sanctions. 30 Even among the Ukrainian Crisis, plans
to expand the Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to northern Germany have not
slowed down.
The Nord Stream 2 would bypass Ukraine, and possibly deprive them of almost 2
billion USD per year. 31 Ukraine already needed a bailout from the International
Monetary Fund in September of 2016. 32 Germany is clearly stuck between its values of
promoting human rights and international stability, and its own economic interests.
Berlin, so quick to compromise on issues with its allies, needs to remember that it cannot
do the same with its rivals. As implied by the title of the report, Germany should heed the
advice of “New Power, New Responsibility” when it notes:
What is true is that conflicts between German values and interest,
especially in dealing with authoritarian states, are often unavoidable in the
short term and that they must be balanced from case to case. In the long29
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term, however, a commitment to values is an existential interest for any
Western democracy. 33
As much as domestic support is important in creating a foreign policy strategy, it
is actions, which demonstrate credibility to the international world. It is time for the
Chancellery, whose, “instinct is against running much ahead of German opinion,” to
begin creating public opinion instead of following it. 34
Broad public support was essential in creating the 2016 White Paper. However,
the administration may have learned its lessons too well: detailed engagement with the
German public as educational outreach is important; and it is also correct that one of the
best ways to educate the public is by engaging in large scale Socratic seminars and
guided discussions. However, it is time to stop offering debates to the public when with
the explicit purpose of informing and not in contributing to writing new policy. Public
support was already gathered to write the White Paper, now it is time to implement it.
There will always be critics, and the best way to silence them is not to debate them but to
show them they are wrong. PeaceLab2016 has produced over 1300 tweets since April of
2016 and yet has only 343 followers. 35 The public has a much lower attention span when
discussing how Germany intervenes compared to discussing when or if it should
intervene in the first place.
The German public consented to the White Book, and now it is time follow
through on what was written. As mentioned earlier, the German Governments believe in
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foreign policy “broadly rooted in society.” 36 The white paper has rooted such support,
and now the government needs to begin the growth process. If it fails to fund or supply
the German Military with enough soldiers, or follow through on its rhetoric and strategy
of remaining tough on Russia, the White Paper will have been written for nothing.
Germany has gathered as much public support as it could have hoped for, now it is time
to leverage that support into action. As discussed in Chapter 2, the White Paper was a
signal to the international world, but actions will always speak louder than words.
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International Reactions to the White Paper
While the German White Paper is less than six months old, the international community
has already responded. Russia, the European Union, and the United States have had the strongest
and most important of these reactions. Russia responded scathingly, denying Germany’s
accusations of being a spoiler in the international system, and accused Germany of remilitarizing
in order to dominate its neighbors yet again. The EU responded mildly positively, with great
support from the political elite and a general non-reaction from its citizens. US support has been
overwhelming, with calls for Germany to actually go further and take on more responsibility
than it already has. Although the Russian response is both troubling and important, for the most
part Germany has done an excellent job marketing itself and its interests to the international
community and is in a good position to achieve those aims.
Russia is gaining a negative reputation for the high volume of propaganda it releases
online, and pro-Russian internet activists have earned themselves the nickname “Putin’s Trolls”,
“Numerous examples of highly biased and propagandist coverage of international affairs by the
Russian media have often been highlighted by well-respected commentators, experts, and
journalists”. 1 One of the most influential outlets is Russia Today, a television channel and
Internet news-source. Russia Today, rebranded as RT, claims to, “create news with an edge for
viewers who Question More [SIC].” 2 However, while becoming more informed is almost always
a good idea, the Columbia Journalism Review notes that RT is, “known as an extension of former
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President Vladimir Putin’s confrontational foreign policy.” 3 It is highly provocative, relies upon
questionable experts and sources, and presents only one side of the issues. However, sorting
through RT’s bias opens an opportunity to understand what the Russian Political Elite wants
people to believe, and therefore their opinion of international affairs.
RT wrote a reactionary response to the German White Paper, titled “Germany moves to
run its own EU Army -- leaving both Brussels & NATO in new crisis.” 4 The article builds a
narrative that a race between the EU and Germany to build a European army for purposes of
political prestige is splitting NATO and making it less cohesive. The author compares the third
Reich the rise of the alternative Right, then argues, “it’s a stark choice between a German
chancellor running such an ambitious military operation or the rather ineffective EU diplomat
Federica Mogherini, who has struggled to achieve even the most fledgling success.” 5 Russia is
disappointed that their almost belligerent behavior has been brought to light in such an important
document. Their hopefulness that a stronger German military or European Army might actually
weaken the European position reveals a fear that such a program will be successful.
Several Russian political figures have also made their disappointment clear. An
authorless RT article cites two members, one from the upper and one from the lower chamber of
the Russian Duma. Both go on the offensive, such as when Alexey Pushkov claimed the harsh
language used in the White Paper is, “more a sign of Berlin’s ‘subordination’ to the US than a
demonstration of ‘the real state of affairs.” 6 Konstantin Kosachev from the upper chamber
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responded less aggressively, and merely insists, “Moscow has never abandoned cooperation and
partnership with the West…it’s not Russia who withdrew from cooperation with NATO.” 7 They
both make the US and the West responsible, without responding the White Paper’s claims.
The most direct response has been from the spokeswoman from the Russian Foreign
Ministry, Maria Zakharova, who claimed, “[r]emarks mentioned in the doctrine on the need to
cooperate with Russia in the sphere of common interests do not cancel the fact that by approving
the White Paper, Berlin is cementing a confrontational component of its entire policy in regard to
Russia in the long term.” 8 Again, instead of acknowledging the actions Russia is accused of, the
foreign policy talking point is to shift the blame from the Russian government to the accuser.
Berlin is not going to change the strategy document it spent two years writing because of a
negative Russian response, so the Kremlin’s posturing is most likely for the benefit of Russian
citizens. The posturing continued as the diplomat ominously ended her comments noting,
"Berlin’s another [SIC] anti-Russian insinuation cannot but arouse regret and we will take it into
consideration in the aspect of Russian-German relations." 9 By doubling down on its “strategic
rivalry”, Russia can put the onus on the West, and scapegoat the US to Russian citizens for the
sanctions placed upon them. This is even easier given the pro-Russia leanings of former DDR
citizens mentioned in Chapter 3, which gives Russia the ease of pointing out support from
abroad. 10 Further analysis of domestic Russia is beyond the scope of this paper, but noteworthy
is that the nature of these decentralized accusations of the West through online propaganda sites
does not necessarily reveal Russian confidence, but fear of increased Western power.
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Other member states of the European Union responded generally positively to the
German White Paper, with some exceptions. While there has not been a plethora of official
responses from EU states, the response to the German White Paper can be benchmarked by
looking at support for a European-wide Army, especially one in which Germany takes the lead.
While support for such an army cannot be directly correlated with individual points of the White
Paper, the detailed requirements for creating such a European Army are indeed all major themes
of the German White Paper, including increased European cooperation, increased military
spending, and a general wish for more European Influence in international affairs.
The UK is one of the only states that has not and does not want increased European
integration – not only militarily but, as Brexit shows, in other domains too. When the German
White Paper was first leaked in a Financial Times article, Brexit leaders immediately took issue
with it. Mike Hookem, member of the European parliament and the United Kingdom
Independence Party, claimed the EU would force the UK into joining its Army saying, “David
Cameron and the traditional parties have neither the political will nor clout in Europe to defend
our armed forces from becoming one part of a far-reaching European military structure.” 11 With
the impending Brexit, only 2% of British MEPs supported more integration in defense policy,
placing them second to last in European support, ahead of only Ireland.
However, because after the UK leaves, they will no longer be able to veto or even vote
against increased integration, “from the perspective of the CSDP [Common Security and
Defence Policy], Brexit is actually a positive development,” according to Eva Chitul and Doru
Frantescu. 12 In order to, “inject new Momentum,” and, “relaunch the European project,” all 27
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current EU members except for the UK met in Bratislava for a one day meeting in September,
during which Italy called for a joint permanent European Multinational Force (EMF). 13 This was
unexpected and was an expansion of the proposal jointly made by Germany and France, which
called only for the establishment of a permanent EU headquarters. 14 High levels of support came
from Germany, Italy, Spain, and although French MEP’s were more divided on the issue, they
were one of the two countries to initiate the conversation.
The highest levels of support came from, “former Russian satellite states in Eastern
Europe,” like Romania. 15 This can be explained using Stephen Walt’s balance-of-power theory
that argues that these states are “Balancing” against Russia, which they see as a rising power. 16
Besides bad experiences with the former Soviet Union:
To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence.
The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order
to avoid being dominated by those who can. 17
eastern European states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania support further integration with a vote
of at least 70%. 18 They are watching international developments keenly, and because Russia has
already shown its willingness to “dominate its allies” - as shown by its actions in Georgia and the
Ukraine, these states feel that it is in their best interest to integrate into the European Union.
The least amount of support for a European Army came from traditionally neutral states:
mainly the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. However, because MEPs do
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not vote by nations and instead group themselves independently into coalitions, there is still
some support in nations like Austria. In fact, when support for a Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO), rather than the EMF is examined, only five of the twenty-eight EU
members do not demonstrate majority support for increased defense policy integration (e.g. joint
headquarters) within the European Parliament. While PESCO does not go as far as a standing
EMF, it still demonstrates a marked increase in European security Cooperation, and therefore
serves as a positive benchmark for the German White Paper.
Most importantly, support for a more deeply integrated Europe is trending upwards. The
election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States spurred a new wave of talks.
German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen claimed that President-elect Trump’s victory has
“cast doubt” on NATOs mutual defense pact; a view echoed by Jean-Claude Juncker, president
of the European Commission. 19 Juncker, while not specifying the US-election, held a press
conference the day after the election results were announced, saying that US-EU relations
shouldn’t be reset, “out of anger,” and declaring, “We have a lot to thank the American’s for…
but they won’t look after Europe’s security forever.” 20 In the wake of the election, there was an
impromptu session held in Brussels for the Heads of States to talk. While the UK and Hungary
did not attend, and France sent only an envoy, enough members were present to sign off on a
new defense plan, which allows the EU to deploy forces to stabilize a crisis before a UN
resolution is passed. 21 While the meeting “played down” talk of a European Army, many state
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officials offered commentary similar to the French Foreign Minister, who called it an, “essential
step forward.” 22 Being only a step forward, future projects can be expected as well.
An essential caveat to this willingness to integrate European Security is that the support
for these initiatives came from the “political elite,” specifically the Members of the European
Parliament. Support from citizens is generally much lower. Sputnik news, a Russian media
outlet, claimed last year that 36% of Germans and 37% of French would rather have an EU army
to protect Europe than have NATO fulfill that role. 23 It is important to note that the Russian
outlet (which publishes sensationalist articles with titles like “Washington Wants Bloodshed in
Aleppo to Continue”) has incentive to over-report the number of EU citizens calling for a
European army (the “end of NATO “) to show the “divide” between Europe and the US. 24
However, even from a biased source, only a minority of European citizens support such a
measure. As seen in the previous chapter, there is a disconnect between the politicians making
foreign policy decisions and their domestic base of support. Whether or not the support gap
applies to Germany’s new White Paper or only to a European army is much more difficult to
determine; but a lack of protest against the new German White Paper and recent defense
proposals signals, “No news is good news.” Even if it is the case that the average EU citizens
merely doesn’t care about Germany’s re-militarization, the lack of concern after Germany’s
instigation of two World-Wars is telling in itself.
The last major actor whose reaction should be considered is the US. Although, like in
Europe, the White Paper has, “received limited attention in the Anglophone media,” 25 unlike the
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haltingly positive European response, US Foreign Policy experts overwhelmingly support the
new German Strategy. Jeffrey Rathke, Senior Fellow for the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, notes that the White Paper gives Germany a central role, “which in the
uncertain times facing U.S. security… is a bright spot from an American perspective.” 26
Contrary to European Opinion, Rathke feels that the White Paper does not goes far enough. He
points out that it self-describes Germany as a, “middle-sized power,” which he feels is, “a
frustratingly false modesty… and unnecessarily self-limiting.” 27 Alison Smale of the New York
Times also embodies the positive American reaction in an article titled “In a Reversal,
Germany’s Military Growth is Met With Western Relief.” 28 Concerns about German remilitarization and strength, very real just 25 years after German Reunification, have completely
disappeared. In fact, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies hosted an almost
celebratory “Roll-Out Event” for the White Paper, including panels and networking
opportunities. 29
Americans seem to be happy with the White Paper’s aims, even if they don’t know of its
existence. Both President Obama and President-elect Trump have complained of other NATO
members acting as “free-riders.” 30 Whether America wants to become more isolationist or, on
the contrary, strengthen ties with our partners, more activity and enthusiasm from another state
with similar goals and interests is a positive event.
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In general, the international reaction to the White Paper was almost entirely a success. No
foreign state outside of Russia is concerned about increased German hard power. Germany has
successfully built trust and cohesion over the last quarter century to the point where it is a valued
player in the western democratic order. In fact, many of Germany’s allies are excited by the
country’s remilitarization and wish it were even more involved. The two countries expressing
displeasure at Germany’s updated strategy are Russia and the UK. Russia, acting as a spoiler
state even before the new document was released, seems unlikely to halt its behavior, regardless
of whether Germany chooses to become a lion or a sheep. The UK has fears that Germany and
the EU will bypass NATO, but because it will soon no longer be able to block European
integration, Germany is in an excellent position to achieve its foreign policy goals, and
specifically its military integrationist plans, within the international community.
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The Way Forward: Obstacles to implementation of
the White Paper
Germany’s successful implementation of the White Paper faces three problems:
Russia’s propaganda disrupts German discourse; unfavorable results of the upcoming
federal election could seriously obstruct the White Paper’s chances of implementation;
and the European Union continues to fracture. For a successful implementation of the
White Paper, the German government will firstly need to decrease the Russian media’s
influence on Germany’s citizens. Second, the political leaders who created the White
Paper will need to remain in power, with their re-election serving as a mandate by the
German people to continue down the path of increased international involvement.
Finally, the European Union must remain cohesive, especially on issues such as the
refugee and debt crises. Germany will have to “lead from the center” and stabilize the
EU by reaching out publically, fiscally, and militarily. Because of the shift towards
Euroskepticism among the German electorate, solutions to the last two problems are
somewhat incompatible. Chancellor Merkel needs to work for the EU to keep the region
stable, while convincing the German people she cares about Germany first.
On the face of it, the Russian propaganda network is an amazing accomplishment.
The German White Paper only identifies propaganda within a framework of hybrid
warfare, noting that, “[h]ybrid attacks can target all areas of society through cyber-attacks
and information operations (e.g. propaganda) … to delay or completely prevent an
immediate and decisive response by the state under attack.” 1 In listing ways to counter
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the information warfare aspect, the White Paper recommends an effective early-warning
system, and calls upon politicians, the media, and society at large to expose propaganda
and counter it with facts. 2
For contrast, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 does not consider
propaganda as a means within a framework, but an end in itself. The Concept explicitly
declares, “[Russia] must ‘create instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the
world’, ‘develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion
abroad’, and ‘counteract information threats to its sovereignty and security.’” 3 Germany
sees information warfare as a subset of hybrid warfare, but because Russia sees it as
important in its own right, “[t]he ability to project narratives to foreign audiences
is…considered a matter of national security.” 4 While Germany has identified information
operations in a strategic context for the first time in the White Paper, Russia has spent the
last decade developing these capabilities. As long as Russia can project and control
narratives outside of its borders, Germany needs to create effective counters, lest it and
the EU be susceptible to artificial division and declining social capital. Essentially,
Russian propaganda will cause confusion, polarize the German people, and disrupt nay
policy consensus that may be possible.
Russia’s “war on information” is not new. In 2014, a law restricting foreign
ownership and management control of media outlets ousted CNN and BBC from Russian
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airwaves. In short, Russia successful centralized its news. 5 Most troublesome, however,
is their exportation of propaganda to other countries, briefly mentioned in Chapter Four. 6
Germany needs to continue supporting and promoting free Internet at home and
abroad. Politicians should utilize twitter and other media to connect directly to the
German people and denounce specific Russian propaganda efforts. For example, an
anonymous spokeswoman from the German interior ministry told the right-wing
newspaper Welt am Sonntag that turning back all refugee boats was, “what the minister
believes.” 7 Dozens of articles from outlets like the Express, Daily Mail, and Independent
buried the original article 8 within 24 hours with sensational headlines like “'DON'T
COME HERE!' Merkel migrant U-turn as Germany orders EU to SEND BACK boats to
Africa” without reaching out for comment and often citing no sources at all. 9 The
original article is almost impossible to find, both because so many other sensational
outlets show up first on Google, and because it is in German. The English-language
outlets do not link to it, if they mention the original article at all. The German
Government should issue a direct but proportional response, perhaps via tweet or other
social media, immediately both clarifying the situation and pointing out the poor
journalism.
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According to Hans-Georg Maassen, chief of the Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution, “We have the impression that [information manipulation] is part of a
hybrid threat that seeks to influence public opinion and the decision making process.” 10
Angela Merkel also recently warned the public, “We are already, even now, having to
deal with [false] information out of Russia… it may be that this could also play a role
during the election campaign.” 11 Other members of the German government must follow
suit in denouncing foreign influence in their domestic sphere.
The way to counter Russian propaganda abroad is by reporting concrete and
accessible facts. In a parallel to another age, successful Western propaganda in the USSR
was not propaganda at all—but regular America media. When Soviet theaters showed
The Grapes of Wrath to display the, “desperate misery of the Okies under the most
advanced system of capitalism on the planet,” it backfired. The USSR pulled the film
after, “Soviet audiences...could see for themselves that even the most dispossessed of
America’s rural proletariat were shown driving automobiles.” 12 The key is not to present
an alternative opinion against which Russian media outlets can argue, but to utilize
twenty-first-century technology to spread unbiased facts and let people independently
form their own opinion based upon them.
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Matt Armstrong, Governor of the non-governmental organization Broadcasting
Board of Governors, recommends creating Russian-language TV programs in the
successor states of the Soviet Union, and digital offerings that reach millions of Russians
and Russian-speakers. 13 Germany should focus on online platforms, with the purpose of
reaching German citizens most likely to be sympathetic to Russia. The lessons it learned
during its public outreach to create the 2016 White Paper and subsequent foreign policy
initiatives like PeaceLab2016 should be applied to counter Russian disinformation. While
online and cable outlets reach the entire country, dialogues and in person outreach should
focus on the eastern parts of Germany, which are more likely to be sympathetic to
Russia. 14
Kristine Berzina of the German Marshall Fund claims that regardless of promises
between President-elect Trump and President Putin, we should not expect a reconciliation
between Russia and the West anytime soon. But she emphasizes that even if the sanctions
should continue, there is no guarantee they will succeed.
The situation is analogous to the time when OPEC created an artificial shortage
of oil to keep prices high during the 1973 Oil Crisis. However, long-term efforts of
countries to create fuel-efficient engines use alternative resources such as natural gas, and
import from other countries defeated the short-term strategy. Berzina believes that Russia
is similarly changing its economy in reaction to sanctions. She notes that in the absence
of western food imports, she has seen an increase in local stores and locally made goods.
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In essence, “Russian citizens have adapted to their new circumstances.” 15 The sanctions
hit Russia hard, and although Russia’s citizens still suffer the consequences, they have
already weathered the shock. If sanctions are the new normal, they no longer elicit a
reaction. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes, “over-reliance on
sanctions in dealing with Russia risks undercutting their effectiveness over the medium to
long term as the Kremlin inexorably develops mechanisms to evade sanctions or at a
minimum seeks to soften their impact.” 16
One of the only ways to combat hybrid warfare, in which countries engage in
salami tactics by pushing established boundaries without overtly crossing them, is to call
out the offender and draw a clear line. But doing this can be dangerous, because if the
other state does not believe that the lines are firm, they will cross them and incite a war.
Even more dangerous is engaging in modern day appeasement and letting up
against Russia. Just as Germany is and was willing to make economic and political
sacrifices to keep the EU intact, they must make similar sacrifices to continue Russia’s
isolation: starting with the cancelation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.
Germany must call a spade a spade as, “The Kremlin has no intention of being a
reliable partner, and the West should embrace this strategic clarity.” 17 Russia will
continue to exploit the duality in Germany’s plan of, “credible deterrence with a
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willingness to engage in dialogue” until Germany explicitly breaks ties with Russia.
Furthermore, Russia will continue to spread misinformation inside, creating artificial
division inside of Germany.
The second precondition for success of the White Paper is the continued reign of
like-minded political leaders who agree on the strategy. This is an obvious assumption,
but Germany is in the middle of a political upset, which may have stark repercussions for
its foreign policy. The new populist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), has not
published a cohesive platform related to foreign policy. However, it sums up their
response to the new strategic paper as, “The new White Paper is no masterpiece; it leads
the military in the wrong direction.” 18 Since the AfD is primarily an opposition to the
ruling German party coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, it would probably reject any White
Paper on principle, but the AfD is also known for its Euroskepticism. Even after its
Euroskeptic founder Bernd Luke left to form another party, their website still claims,
“The AfD is convinced of the principle of subsidiarity, and rejects the countless attempts
by the EU commission to interfere in the everyday life of its citizens.” 19
In Berlin’s September 2016 Landtag elections, Angela Merkel’s party, the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), lost 8 seats for a total of 31. The AfD, in contrast,
gained its first 25 seats. 20 The AfD can no longer be dismissed as it was in the Economist
article “Europe’s reluctant hegemon.” Speaking about the Fiscal Reforms needed at the
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time, the article noted, “with the exception of the Alternative fuer Deutschland, the new
fringe party, all the parties agree,” and later left out the AfD completely, stating, “if there
are differences [between the parties]…they are about the pace [of the fiscal reforms].” 21
If the AfD wins parliamentary seats in the 2017 German Federal Elections, the attainment
of the Government goals set forth in the White Paper may be at risk. If the AfD wins a
number of seats large enough to force itself into the winning coalition, it is not impossible
that the White Paper would have to be essentially set aside.
The ramifications would be far-reaching. The world at large is looking to
Germany to steward the Western tradition in what they see as an impending phase of
waning US influence. If German influence not only decelerated but shrank, world
confidence could be shaken. NATO states, especially in the Baltic, would likely
militarize to balance against Russia. Russia may see a less cohesive NATO and act even
more aggressively.
The White Paper is a product of the executive branch of the German government.
Thus, the continuation of that executive branch is critical for the continuation and
execution of the document’s central tenets. Chancellor Merkel has announced she will
run for a fourth term, and there is a common consensus that she is running only because
the CDU has no alternative candidate attractive enough to win. Even if she wins the 2017
election, unless she starts grooming a successor soon, the CDU, “may end up leaderless
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by the 2021 election,” and the White Paper will be in just as much jeopardy then as it is
currently. 22
The current German regime is stuck between a rock and hard place. The New
York Times summarizes the situation by reporting that, “Chancellor Angela Merkel of
Germany, under siege domestically but widely seen as a pillar of Western liberalism,
announced on Sunday that she will seek a fourth term next year.” 23 The siege under
which she falls, representing the rock, may be broadly rooted in the AfD, but it is not
limited to it. The two sister parties, the CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), are
in, “the throes of their worst internal crisis in over 40 years.” 24 The southern CSU was
and is firmly against Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the country’s borders to
refugees. Chancellor Merkel’s hard place are crises like the Refugee and Debt Crisis.
Agreements like the deal reached with Turkey may serve as the basis for solving these
crises; however, Chancellor Merkel will need to sooth the German people and convince
them that increased, not decreased integration within the EU is the only way to solve the
crisis.
Simon Tilford of the Center for European Reform notes the rising populist
movement in France, and after prescribing actions Merkel can take to, “prevent the
worsening of the political situation in France,” he declares, “[t]o help France and prevent
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Le Pen [a right-wing presidential candidate] is to risk increased populism in Germany.” 25
The very reforms that would satisfy voters in the Eurozone (i.e. France) by loosening
economic regulations would anger voters of the populist AfD in Germany. Chancellor
Merkel will have to walk a very thin line between the realpolitik of growing her domestic
base of support and pursuing the White Book’s strategy that calls for unprecedented levels
of integration in the EU and strong support for NATO.
If the CDU does not win the 2017 election, the White Paper is unlikely to be
implemented. Yet attempting to implement its proposals now, before the election, will
hurt the CDU’s chances in the election. However, if the current German government
does not at least begin the implementation of the White Paper, the international
community will dismiss Germany’s willingness, “to take on responsibility for Europe’s
security,” as nothing more than lip service. 26 The jury is out on whether Donald Trump’s
election will shock Europeans into increased cooperation, thus easing the burden of
responsibility on Merkel. Perhaps his election will divide Europe further as states rush
into bi-lateral agreements with a United States that is skeptical of existing alliances.
The purpose of my study is not to argue whether implementation of the White
Paper is better than its non-implementation, but to analyze speed-bumps on the way
toward its success.
Of the three pillars on which its successful implementation significantly rests,
increased domestic support in the time leading up to the 2017 elections is the timeliest
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and therefore most important. Responses to Russian influence can be developed
simultaneously – something that will actually help the CDU maintain its standing among
the electorate. Germany needs to pump enough bilge water to keep the promise of the
European project afloat for another year, while ensuring that the next generation of the
German leadership receive a mandate in 2017 to pursue the strategy of the White Paper.
Deflating the influence Russia has on the German people will go a long way towards this
goal. These three obstacles stand in the way of implementing the White Paper in the first
place. If the White Paper survives these hurdles, it will become a part of German Security
Policy. Only time can provide the perspective to judge if it contains the right strategies to
pursue or not.
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